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I. INTRODUCTION 
This year, the Ninth Circuit held that a single unsolicited call to a 
woman’s cellphone created sufficient harm for her to file suit  under the 
Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”).1  The TCPA, codified in 
1991, was initially enacted to prohibit companies from sending 
advertisements to potential consumers through their personal facsimile 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2019, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A. in Business 
Administration, Lees-McRae College, summa cum laude, 2016. My deepest thanks 
to Professor Linda Fisher and Jackie Comunale for their guidance and insight during 
the drafting of this note.  
 1  Susinno v. Work Out World Inc., 862 F.3d 346, 352 (3d Cir. 2017). 
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(“fax”) machines.2  Since then, technology has advanced tremendously, 
and while the use of fax advertisements has declined, companies have 
looked to emerging technologies to reach customers directly.3  Text 
messages are an appealing medium for such schemes, with six billion text 
messages sent daily in 2011, and the average person sending or receiving 
thirty-five messages every day.4 
In the 2016 case of Spokeo v. Robins,5 the Supreme Court analyzed 
the injury requirement for a claim filed under the Fair Credit Reporting 
Act of 1970 and held that an injury must be both “particularized” and 
“concrete” in order for a plaintiff to have standing to sue.  Since the ruling 
was passed down, Spokeo has been used by federal Circuit Courts to 
analyze other consumer litigation claims.6 
Recent TCPA litigation has addressed the issue of whether the harms 
being alleged under the Act are “concrete” and “particularized.”7  This 
has been a difficult question the Circuit Courts, who have attempted to 
address claims regarding technology that did not exist when the TCPA 
was enacted in 1991.8  This unresolved question presents problems for 
both businesses and consumers: businesses attempt to market to 
consumers through modern technology, while consumers attempt to 
preserve their right to privacy.9 
In decisions examining the TCPA, both the Third and the Ninth 
Circuits found that unwanted messages from businesses constituted 
“particularized” and “concrete” harms under Spokeo.10  While this 
consumer-friendly approach has been the trend of the Circuit Courts, the 
Fourth Circuit took a contrary stance in formulation of the harm 
requirement under Spokeo.11 
Under the majority interpretation of the Spokeo framework, courts 
 
 2  Spencer W. Waller, Daniel B. Heidtke & Jessica Stewart, The Telephone 
Consumer Protection Act of 1991: Adapting Consumer Protection to Changing 
Technology, 26 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 343, 355 (quoting S. REP. NO. 102-178, at 
3 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.A.N. 1968, 1970). 
 3  Id. at 395. 
 4  Marissa A. Potts, “Hello, it’s me [Please don’t sue me!]: Examining the 
FCC’s Overbroad Calling Regulations under the TCPA, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 281, 
283 (2016). 
 5  Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1542-45 (2016). 
 6  See, e.g. Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Grp., L.L.C., 847 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 
2017).  
 7  Id. 
 8  See, e.g., Van Patten, 847 F.3d at 1040. 
 9  See, e.g., id. 
 10  Van Patten, 847 F.3d at 1041; Susinno v. Work Out World Inc., 862 F.3d 346, 
352 (3d Cir. 2017). 
 11  Dreher v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 856 F.3d 337, 340 (4th Cir. 2017). 
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have deemed receiving an unsolicited text message to be an injury to a 
plaintiff.12  While these rulings have aligned with the legislative intent of 
the TCPA, they ignore the realities of the shift in how technology affects 
consumers.13  This note will discuss Spokeo, the current split amongst the 
nation’s appellate courts over its interpretation, and what should 
constitute a litigious injury for TCPA claims. 
Section II will discuss the TCPA and explain its intended purpose.  
Section III will examine the Spokeo case and discuss the holding’s impact 
on the analysis of subsequent TCPA claims.  Section IV will discuss how 
plaintiffs bring TCPA claims, and specifically, what the injury 
requirements are for successful claims.  Section V will analyze the circuit 
court decisions for consumer protection claims following the Spokeo 
ruling.  Section VI will examine how the TCPA interpretation has 
changed as technology has advanced, and Section VII will apply the 
current legal framework to the question of whether a text message should 
constitute a concrete injury under the TCPA. 
II. TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 
Prior to the TCPA, Congress had not addressed the new 
telecommunications technologies that emerged at the end of the twentieth 
century.  This lack of regulation left use of such devices unregulated and 
prone to abuse by unscrupulous advertisers.14  One prominent marketing 
medium among such advertisers was the fax machine.15  Businesses 
would gain access to consumers’ numbers and then send promotions, 
often unsolicited, through consumers’ fax machines.16  This practice was 
inexpensive for companies since their targets, whose ink and toner were 
used to print the advertisements, bore most of the financial burden.17  
Consumers also faced blocked phone lines and general annoyance, as 
they had no control in receiving these advertisements.18 
States attempted to regulate these burdensome practices, but 
interstate telecommunication structures made the legislation 
ineffective.19  In response to states’ demand for federal regulation, 
 
 12  Amanda Bronstad, Latest TCPA Decision Eases Path for Consumers, 
Deepens Circuit Split, 223 N.J. L. J. 1, 1 (2017).  
 13  Id. 
 14  Waller, Heidtke & Stewart, supra note 2, at 347. 
 15  Waller, Heidtke & Stewart, supra note 2, at 347. 
 16  Waller, Heidtke & Stewart, supra note 2, at 354. 
 17  Waller, Heidtke & Stewart, supra note 2, at 354. 
 18  Yuri R. Linetsky, Protection of “Innocent Lawbreakers”: Striking the Right 
Balance in the Private Enforcement of the Anti “Junk Fax” Provisions of the 
Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 90 NEB. L. REV. 70, 78-79 (2011). 
 19  Waller, Heidtke & Stewart, supra note 2, at 347. 
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Congress enacted the Telephone Consumer Protection Act in 1991, with 
the purpose of “imposing restrictions on the use of telephones for 
unsolicited advertising by telephone and fax.”20  The TCPA was a 
response to the issue presented by modern consumers’ increasing access 
to telecommunication technologies.21  Unlike previous advertising 
regulations, which focused on regulating an advertisement’s content, the 
TCPA focuses on regulating the medium of advertisement conveyance.22 
The TCPA protects consumers from unsolicited advertisements, 
which the law defines as “any material advertising the commercial 
availability of any property, goods, or services, which is transmitted to 
any person without that person’s prior express invitation or 
permission.”23  This definition excludes “(A) . . . any person with that 
person’s prior express invitation or permission, (B) . . . any person with 
whom the caller has an established business relationship, or (C) . . . a tax 
exempt nonprofit organization[s].”24 
TCPA claims are most commonly enforced in private actions.25  The 
Act allows plaintiffs to bring: (1) an action to recover for a monetary loss 
from a violation, (2) an action to recover $500 in damages for each such 
violation, or both.26  In addition, the court has the discretion to award 
punitive damages of up to three times the amount recoverable for 
compensatory damages if it finds that the defendant “willfully or 
knowingly” violated the TCPA.27  Although it is the most common 
method of enforcement, private action is limited in “incentivizing 
lawsuits against, and deterring the actions of, intentional violators” of the 
Act.28 
State governments have the authority to bring civil action under the 
TCPA when a company shows a “pattern or practice of violations.”29  
State governments have not used this power often, instead relying on 
private actions to enforce the TCPA.30  Because TCPA injuries are not 
destructive or dangerous, state governments do not prioritize 
enforcement.31 
 
 20  Waller, Heidtke & Stewart, supra note 2, at 347. 
 21  Waller, Heidtke & Stewart, supra note 2, at 350. 
 22  Waller, Heidtke & Stewart, supra note 2, at 350. 
 23  47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(5) (2018).  
 24  Id. § 227(a)(4).  
 25  Waller, Heidtke & Stewart, supra note 2, at 348. 
 26  47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) (2018).  
 27  47 U.S.C. § 227(b)-(c) (2018). 
 28  Waller, Heidtke & Stewart, supra note 2, at 348. 
 29  47 U.S.C. § 227(g)(1) (2011). 
 30  Waller, Heidtke & Stewart, supra note 2, at 375. 
 31  Waller, Heidtke & Stewart, supra note 2, at 375. 
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The TCPA also permits administrative action against violators of the 
statute.32  The Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) is the 
agency responsible for administrative enforcement.33  The FCC has a 
form available on its website for consumers to report TCPA violations.34  
Under the Act, “[a]ny person that is determined by the Commission . . . 
to have violated [the TCPA] shall be liable to the United States [for a 
forfeiture penalty].”35  The FCC is also responsible for prescribing 
regulations to implement the statute.36  While the FCC has broad 
authority to enforce and interpret the statute, it is limited by the same slow 
processing that burdens state enforcement, again leaving a majority of 
TCPA enforcement in the hands of private litigants.37 
The TCPA has been amended by Congress to cover modern 
technologies that emerged after its enactment in 1991.38  The Ninth 
Circuit has deemed the FCC’s interpretation of the phrase “to call” as 
“communicat[ing] with a person by telephone” to be reasonable.39  Under 
this interpretation, the Act applies to both voice calls and text messages.40  
This is consistent with the intended purpose of protecting consumer 
privacy, as “a voice or text message [is] not distinguishable in terms of 
being an invasion of privacy.”41 
III. SPOKEO V. ROBINS 
In 2016, a claim filed under the Fair Credit Reporting Act made its 
way to the Supreme Court.42  Defendant operated a company that 
provided a database for information about individuals.43  The controversy 
arose when the company gave incorrect information about the plaintiff to 
a third party.44  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the 
sufficiency of the injury claimed by the plaintiff.45  In the context of 
Article III standing, the Court held that “a plaintiff’s injury must be both 
 
 32  Linetsky, supra note 18, at 79. 
 33  Linetsky, supra note 18, at 79. 
 34  Id. at 80. 
 35  47 U.S.C. § 227 (e)(5)(A)(i) (2018). 
 36  Id. 
 37  Waller, Heidtke & Stewart, supra, note 2 at 348. 
 38  Waller, Heidtke & Stewart, supra, note 2 at 367. 
 39  Waller, Heidtke & Stewart, supra, note 2 at 367. 
 40  Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Grp., L.L.C., 847 F.3d 1037, 1041 (9th Cir. 
2017) (citing In re Rules & Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer 
Protection Act of 1991, 18 F.C.C. Rcd. 14014, 14115 (F.C.C. June 26, 2003). 
 41  Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, 569 F.3d 946, 954 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 42  Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1544 (2016). 
 43  Id. at 1544. 
 44  Id.  
 45  Id.  
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‘particularized’ and ‘concrete,’ and courts considering the issue must 
distinguish between those characteristics in their standing analysis.”46  
The Court based its holding on the Constitution, finding “a plaintiff 
‘cannot allege a bare procedural violation, divorced from any concrete 
harm, and satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III.’”47 
IV. JURISDICTION FOR TCPA CLAIMS 
A. Article III Standing 
For a court to have jurisdiction, the plaintiff must present a claim 
with standing.48  Standing is the “right to make a legal claim or seek 
judicial enforcement of a duty or right.”49  Article III of the United States 
Constitution addresses federal court standing, requiring a “case or 
controversy” to be established in order for a federal court to have 
jurisdiction.50  Article III has three requirements for establishing a “case” 
or “controversy”: (1) an injury-in-fact, (2) that was caused by the 
defendant, and (3) that is redressable.51  An “injury-in-fact” is defined as 
“[a]n actual or imminent invasion of a legally protected interest, in 
contrast to an invasion that is conjectural or hypothetical.”52  If the 
defendant caused an injury-in-fact, and the injury is redressable, a federal 
court has Article III standing to hear and decide the case.53 
In addition to Article III standing, federal courts also require 
prudential standing.54  This doctrine specifies that “prudential rules 
should govern the determination [of] whether a party should be granted 
standing to sue . . . [t]he most important rule [being] that a plaintiff who 
asserts an injury must come within the ‘zone of interest’ arguably 
protected by the Constitution or a statute.”55  Under the prudential-
standing doctrine, a case with Article III standing may lack federal 
jurisdiction if there is no prudential standing.56  This requirement was 
 
 46  Id. at 1545.  
 47  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see also Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1544, 1549. 
 48  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 49  Priya Khangura, Hurdles to the Court: The Doctrine of Standing Under 
Statutory Violations, 11 DUKE J. CONST. LAW & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 41, 41 (2016) 
(citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)). 
 50  Id.  
 51  Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).  
 52  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 405 (Bryan A. Garner ed., Thomson Reuters 5th 
Pocket ed. 2016).  
 53  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 54  Khangura, supra note 49, at 41. 
 55  Injury-in-Fact, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 638 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 
Thomson Reuters 5th Pocket ed. 2016). 
 56  Id. 
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enacted to limit the role of courts in areas of public dispute.57 
The prudential standing doctrine has two exceptions: (1) the 
existence of “countervailing circumstances,” or (2) if Congress grants “an 
express right of action to persons who otherwise would be barred.”58  
However, these exceptions do not apply to the Article III standing 
requirements.59  Federal courts require an injury-in-fact to establish 
jurisdiction, regardless of whether Congress granted a right of action by 
statute.60 
B. Harm Requirement 
In recent TCPA cases, circuit courts have used the “concrete” and 
“particularized” analysis from Spokeo when conducting the standing 
analysis.61  Spokeo holds that, for consumer plaintiffs to satisfy the injury-
in-fact requirement under Article III, the plaintiff must show an injury is 
“concrete and particularized.”62  An injury is “concrete” when it actually 
exists, rather than being a mere abstraction.63  However, the injury does 
not have to cause a tangible harm.64  For consumer litigation claims, the 
harm alleged can be intangible.65  While this does not bar an 
establishment of concreteness, a court must determine if an actual harm 
has been particularized.66  An injury is “particularized” when it “affects 
the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.”67  To determine the 
sufficiency of an alleged injury, courts follow the two-step inquiry 
established in Spokeo.68 
The first step to determine sufficiency of an injury is to define the 
protected legal interest.69  This can be done by looking to the language 
and legislative history of the statute.70  Though statutory intent indicates 
a likelihood of recognizable harm, the Spokeo decision affirmed a statute 
granting a right to file a claim that does not “automatically satisf[y] the 
 
 57  Khangura, supra note 49, at 41 (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 
(1975)).  
 58  Khangura, supra note 49, at 41 (citing Warth, 422 U.S. at 501). 
 59  Khangura, supra note 49, at 51. 
 60  Khangura, supra note 49, at 51. 
 61  See, e.g. Susinno v. Work Out World Inc., 862 F.3d 346, 350 (3d Cir. 2017).  
 62  Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016) (emphasis added). 
 63  Id.  
 64  Id. 
 65  Id. at 1549. 
 66  Id. 
 67  Id.  
 68  Michael G. McLellan, Finding a Leg to Stand on: Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins and 
Statutory Standing in Consumer Litigation, 31 ANTITRUST ABA 49, 50 (2017). 
 69  Id.  
 70  Id. 
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injury-in-fact requirement.”71 
Once the court establishes a protected legal interest, the analysis 
then proceeds to step two: a determination of whether the harm violates 
a legally protected interest.72  Justice Alito explained in Spokeo that, 
because the analysis is based on historical practices, “it [can be] 
instructive to consider whether an alleged intangible harm has a close 
relationship to a harm that has traditionally been regarded as providing a 
basis for a lawsuit in English or American courts.”73  A legally protected 
interest can also be inferred by looking to the legislature’s intent in 
enacting the statute.74 
V. CIRCUIT COURT CASES FOLLOWING SPOKEO V. ROBINS 
A. Ninth Circuit 
i. Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness 
In 2017, Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness applied the Spokeo analysis 
to a TCPA claim.75  The plaintiff filed suit after receiving a series of 
promotional texts from Vertical Fitness.76  Vertical Fitness had acquired 
a gym of which the plaintiff had previously been a member.77  Though 
the plaintiff had only been a member of that gym for three days, the 
plaintiff provided his personal information, including his phone number, 
when submitting an application.78  Three years after leaving the gym, 
Vertical Fitness, which had obtained his number during their acquisition 
of the gym, sent the plaintiff promotional text messages.79 
In response to the text messages sent by Vertical Fitness, the plaintiff 
filed a putative class action under the TCPA.80  His claim alleged Vertical 
Fitness had “caus[ed] consumers actual harm” with “the aggravation that 
necessarily accompanies wireless spam” along with having to “pay their 
cell phone service providers for the receipt of such wireless spam.”81 
When the Ninth Circuit analyzed the plaintiff’s standing, it used the 
 
 71  Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549. 
 72  McLellan, supra note 68, at 49.  
 73  Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549. 
 74  McLellan, supra note 68, at 49.  
 75  Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Grp., L.L.C., 847 F.3d 1037, 1041 (9th Cir. 
2017). 
 76  Id. 
 77  Id.  
 78  Id.  
 79  Id.  
 80  Id. 
 81  Van Patten, 847 F.3d at 1041.  
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standard established in Spokeo.82  In determining if there had been a 
concrete harm, the court looked to historically recognized cognizable 
harms in English and American courts.83  When Congress enacted the 
TCPA, it found that “‘unrestricted telemarketing can be an intrusive 
invasion of privacy’ and is a ‘nuisance.’”84  In traditional English and 
American law, invasion of privacy and nuisance have been considered 
substantial harms, warranting judicial relief.85  The Ninth Circuit found 
that unsolicited calls and texts, “by their nature, invade the privacy and 
disturb the solitude of recipients.”86  Because the harm addressed by the 
TCPA had historically been recognized by the courts, the Ninth Circuit 
held the text messages were a concrete and particularized harm that 
entitled the plaintiff to both Article III and prudential standing.87 
B. Third Circuit 
i. Susinno v. Work Out World, Inc. 
In Sussino, the Third Circuit considered the harm requirement for a 
TCPA claim.88  The plaintiff’s claim in the case centered around a single 
unsolicited call to her cellphone from defendant Work Out World, Inc. 
(“WOW”).89  The plaintiff alleged harm derived from a one-minute, 
prerecorded promotional message left on the plaintiff’s voicemail by 
WOW.90  In opposition to the claim, WOW asserted that “the structure of 
[the TCPA provision] limits the scope of ‘cellular telephone services’ to 
when ‘the called party is charged for the call.’”91  Citing the Second 
Restatement of Torts, WOW argued that “‘two or three’ calls would not 
be considered ‘highly offensive to the ordinary reasonable [person],’ thus 
leaving no injury-in-fact for the plaintiff to assert.”92 
Susinno examined whether the TCPA prohibited the defendant’s 
conduct, and if so, whether the harm would be sufficiently concrete and 
particularized to establish Article III and prudential standing.93  After 
 
 82  Id. 
 83  Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1540 (2016). 
 84  Van Patten, 847 F.3d at 1043. 
 85  Id.  
 86  Id. 
 87  Id. 
 88  Susinno v. Work Out World Inc., 862 F.3d 346, 348 (3d Cir. 2017). 
 89  Id. 
 90  Id. at 348. 
 91  Id. at 349. 
 92  Id. at 351-52 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B, cmt. d (AM. 
LAW INST. 1977)). 
 93  Id. at 348. 
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concluding the TCPA did apply, the Third Circuit analyzed the 
sufficiency of the plaintiff’s standing under the Spokeo framework.94  The 
court interpreted Spokeo as a “reiteration [of] traditional notions of 
standing,” specifically noting the traditional principle that “the mere 
technical violation of a procedural requirement of a statute cannot, in and 
of itself, constitute an injury-in-fact.”95 
In applying the Spokeo standard, the court looked to determine 
whether there was a congressionally defined injury.96  The TCPA applies 
“directly to single recorded calls from cell phones,” and in enacting the 
statute, Congress focused on protecting consumers’ privacy interests.97  
In her complaint, the plaintiff alleged harm in the form of a “nuisance and 
invasion of privacy.”98  The court agreed, concluding that the claim was 
the kind Congress intended to address in enacting the TCPA.99 
In addition to asserting a congressionally-identified harm, Spokeo 
also requires that the plaintiff show that such harm be concrete and 
particularized.100  To determine if the harm was concrete, the Third 
Circuit looked to historical tradition of both English and American courts 
to determine if the harm was recognized.101  In conducting such a 
historical analysis, a court must determine whether “newly established 
causes of action protect essentially the same interests that traditional 
causes of action sought to protect.”102  In Sussino, the Third Circuit found 
TCPA claims alleging an “invasion[] of privacy, intrusion upon 
seclusion, and nuisance” have historically been heard in American 
courts.103 
By enacting the statute, Congress “‘elevat[ed] a harm that, while 
previously inadequate in the law,’ was of the same character of previously 
existing ‘legally cognizable injuries.’”104  Because Congress elevated the 
injury, instead of creating a new kind of injury, the Court determined the 
harm was sufficient to establish Article III standing.105  Under this 
interpretation, the Third Circuit determined that a single one-minute 
 
 94  Susinno, 862 F.3d. at 350. 
 95  Id. at 350, 352. 
 96  Id. at 351. 
 97  Id. at 351 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2)(C)).  
 98  Id. 
 99  Id. 
 100  See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1543 (2016). 
 101  Susinno, 862 F.3d at 350-51. 
 102  Id. at 351. 
 103  Id. (quoting Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Grp., L.L.C., 847 F.3d 1037, 1043 
(9th Cir. 2017)).  
 104  Id. at 352. 
 105  Id.  
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voicemail was sufficient to confer standing before a federal court.106 
ii. In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Data Breach Litig. 
In the Third Circuit case, In re Horizon, the court analyzed the harm 
requirement for consumer litigation under the Fair Credit Reporting Act 
(“FCRA”).107  The defendant, Horizon, owned laptops that contained the 
plaintiffs’ personal information.108  When those laptops were stolen, the 
plaintiffs sued the defendants, even though nothing had been done with 
the stolen information to injure the plaintiffs.109  The District Court found 
the plaintiffs did not have standing because “none of them had adequately 
alleged that the information was actually used to their detriment;” 
therefore, there was no injury-in-fact.110 
In In re Horizon, Judge Jordan of the Third Circuit focused on the 
merit of the plaintiff’s argument that the defendant caused an injury by 
“‘plac[ing] [them] at an imminent, immediate, and continuing increased 
risk of harm from identity theft, identity fraud, and medical fraud . . . ‘“111  
In making its determination, the Third Circuit first looked to historical 
precedent, and found there was evidence that “Congress may enact 
statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing, even 
though no injury would exist without the statute.”112 
Previous Third Circuit opinions analyzing the sufficiency of a 
statutory harm for conferring Article III standing were somewhat 
inconsistent.113  The Third Circuit reiterated their own precedent, stating 
that, “[t]he proper analysis of standing focuses on whether the plaintiff 
suffered an actual injury, not on whether a statute was violated.”114  This 
contradicts many of the previous district court decisions within the 
circuit, which had allowed statutory violations to constitute a cognizable 
injury, without considering if there was an actual harm.115 
To resolve the discrepancy within the Third Circuit, the Court 
looked to Spokeo.116  The Circuit Court interpreted Spokeo to mean that 
“Congress ‘has the power to define injuries . . . that were previously 
 
 106  Id.  
 107  In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 629 (3d 
Cir. 2017). 
 108  Id. 
 109  Id. 
 110  Id. 
 111  Id. at 634 (citation omitted) 
 112  Id. at 635 (quoting Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973)). 
 113  In re Horizon, 846 F.3d at 635. 
 114  Id. at 635 n.14. 
 115  Id. at 635.  
 116  Id.  
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inadequate in law.’”117  Under this interpretation, legislatures can “elevate 
intangible harms into concrete harms.”118 
When applying Spokeo, the Third Circuit determined that the facts 
of the current case did not require the “consider[ation] [of] the full reach 
of congressional power to elevate a procedural violation into an injury in 
fact” as “this case [did] not strain that reach.”119  Instead, the court 
determined that case law and common law allowed protection for the 
plaintiffs’ right to privacy, and that “with privacy torts, improper 
dissemination of information can itself constitute a cognizable injury.”120  
While the court conceded this alone may not have been sufficient to 
confer Article III standing, “with the passage of the FCRA, Congress 
established that the unauthorized dissemination of personal information 
by a credit reporting agency causes an injury in and of itself,” and through 
its enactment of the FCRA, Congress had shown that it “believed that the 
violation of the FCRA causes a concrete harm to consumers.”121  The 
Third Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs had alleged a sufficient injury 
that was not a “mere technical or procedural violation of the FCRA,” and 
remanded the plaintiffs’ case so it could proceed to litigation.122 
C. Fourth Circuit 
i. Dreher v. Experion Info. Solutions 
Dreher v. Experion Info. Solutions stands out as one of the most 
defendant-friendly decision amongst the consumer protection cases that 
have had standing which the Spokeo framework analyzed.123  While 
Dreher was brought under the FCRA, it is significant for its analysis of 
the concrete and particularized aspect of the alleged injury-in-fact.124 
The controversy involved a 69,000-member class action, initiated by 
Dreher, against Experion.125  Dreher, while undergoing a background 
check for a security clearance with the federal government, found a 
delinquent credit card account on his credit report.126  Dreher attempted 
to contact the company associated with the card to fix the mistake.127  The 
 
 117  Id. at 638.  
 118  Id.  
 119  In re Horizon, 846 F.3d at 638. 
 120  Id. at 638-39. 
 121  Id. at 639.  
 122  Id. at 640. 
 123  Bronstad, supra note 12.   
 124  Dreher v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 856 F.3d 337, 344 (4th Cir. 2017). 
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fact that the company associated with the delinquent card had closed 
during the 2008 financial crisis was not indicated on the credit report.128  
The portfolio of that company had been given to another company and 
was then assigned to CardWorks, Inc. and CardWorks Servicing L.L.C 
(collectively, “CardWorks”).129  Experion chose not to change the name 
of the company on the plaintiffs’ credit reports to comply with historic 
practices and prevent consumer confusion.130  Dreher brought the class 
action to federal court, where he argued Experian’s failure to change the 
name of the company listed on his credit report caused an informational 
injury.131 
At trial, Experian argued the plaintiff lacked Article III standing.132  
The district court rejected Experian’s argument, finding “the FCRA 
‘creates a statutory right to receive the “sources of information” for one’s 
credit report,’” which created an injury-in-fact sufficient to meet the 
burden of establishing Article III standing.133  During the district court 
trial, held before Spokeo was decided; the “concrete” and “particularized” 
requirements outlined in Spokeo were not considered.134 
Because of the anticipated significance of Spokeo, the Fourth Circuit 
held Dreher in abeyance until the decision was announced.135  Using 
Spokeo, the Fourth Circuit analyzed the plaintiff’s claim that he had 
suffered an injury-in-fact, “because he was denied ‘specific information 
to which [he] w[as] entitled under the FCRA.”‘136  The Court found the 
harm claimed by the plaintiff was not concrete; and therefore, there was 
no Article III standing.137 
The plaintiff attempted to establish concreteness by arguing the 
harm he suffered was “a ‘real’ harm with adverse effect.’”138  The Fourth 
Circuit rejected the contention, finding Dreher was alleging a pure 
statutory violation, with very little injury to himself.139  The most 
significant injury the plaintiff alleged was Experian’s failure to comply 
with the FCRA threatened his security clearance with the federal 
 
 128  Id. at 341. 
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 130  Dreher, 856 F.3d at 341. 
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government.140  The court found, however, that while an actual harm to 
his security clearance would constitute an injury sufficient to establish 
Article III standing, Dreher’s security clearance was not affected by 
Experian’s policy, meaning there was “no real world harm on Dreher.”141  
Because the court found Dreher did not have an injury-in-fact sufficient 
to establish Article III standing, the case was dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction.142 
VI. INTERPRETING MODERN TCPA CLAIMS 
In 1991, one of the leading harms Congress sought to prevent by 
enacting the TCPA was abuse of consumers’ fax machines for unsolicited 
promotional purposes.143  The abuse of this practice led to usage of 
consumers’ tangible resources, including paper, ink, and toner, as well as 
tying-up landlines and being a general nuisance.144  Customers receiving 
promotional faxes often had little control in the faxes being sent, and even 
if they were given the option to opt-out, it was not until after the advertiser 
had already used the consumer’s resources.145 
Today, cell phones have changed the landscape of TCPA 
enforcement.  Studies show that where once having a home phone was a 
staple of American households, the trend today is for people to disconnect 
their home phones and rely exclusively on cell phones.146  As more people 
rely on cellphones, advertisers having access to consumers through their 
phones may cause increasingly detrimental effects.147  If the proper 
regulations are not in place, advertisers can establish more invasive 
telemarketing practices to access to consumers.148 
Following Spokeo, most appellate courts have found a phone call 
constitutes a concrete and particularized harm that can withstand scrutiny 
under the Spokeo standard.149  These findings are based on the idea that 
the violation of the statute demonstrates a concrete injury, and that an 
invasion of privacy is a legally protected interest.150  An argument that 
supports this interpretation is that, even with modern technology, the cost 
 
 140  Id. 
 141  Id.  
 142  Dreher, 856 F.3d at 347. 
 143  Waller, Heidtke & Stewart, supra note 2, at 347. 
 144  Waller, Heidtke & Stewart, supra note 2, at 354. 
 145  Waller, Heidtke & Stewart, supra note 2, at 357. 
 146  Waller, Heidtke & Stewart, supra note 2, at 384. 
 147  Waller, Heidtke & Stewart, supra note 2, at 387. 
 148  Waller, Heidtke & Stewart, supra note 2, at 387. 
 149  Bronstad, supra note 12, at 12. See also McLellan, supra note 68, at 53. 
 150  McLellan, supra note 68, at 53. 
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of advertising is shifted to the consumer.151  This shifting in cost is 
especially detrimental to the twenty-three percent of all wireless 
subscribers who have prepaid cellphone plans.152 
Most courts uphold a plaintiff’s claim of harm under the TCPA 
under the justification that the harm alleged is rooted in common law.153  
As suggested in Spokeo, when the concrete and particularized harm 
element is uncertain, it can be helpful to look to traditional English and 
American law.154  American common law has long recognized a right 
against “unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another.”155  Since 
the Congressional intent in enacting the TCPA was in part to protect the 
privacy interests of consumers, circuit courts have rationally concluded 
that the harm is concrete and particularized, and thus sufficient to 
establish Article III standing.156 
Consumers can still be harmed if advertisers are allowed to send 
promotional text messages, even with opt-out options.157  When 
consumers respond to a promotional text message to opt-out of receiving 
future messages, the advertiser has confirmation that they have reached 
an active cell phone number.158  These entities can then sell that 
information to others, putting consumers at risk for continued privacy 
invasion.159 
Additionally, advertisers can include links that may lead consumers 
to accidentally sign up for services through the same messages offering 
the opt-out option.160  The prevalence of cellphone use, as well as the 
savviness of advertisers, can put consumers at risk for prolonged and 
unwanted invasions of privacy. 
Though the TCPA was enacted to protect consumers from predatory 
businesses, businesses themselves are at risk if the TCPA is too broadly 
interpreted.  This is especially true for small businesses, which often form 
marketing plans without knowledge of the extent of the TCPA or the 
ramifications for violating the TCPA.161  Businesses are facing confusion 
as a result of inconsistent enforcement of the TCPA.162  This is further 
 
 151  Waller, Heidtke & Stewart, supra note 2, at 366. 
 152  Waller, Heidtke & Stewart, supra note 2, at 366. 
 153  McLellan, supra note 68, at 53.  
 154  Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016). 
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 156  See, e.g., Susinno v. Work Out World Inc., 862 F.3d 346, 348 (3d Cir. 2017). 
 157  Waller, Heidtke, & Stewart, supra note 2, at 396. 
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 162  Linetsky, supra note 18, at 74. 
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complicated for the businesses operating across state lines.  With varying 
interpretations of the TCPA amongst federal and state jurisdictions, it can 
be difficult for companies to know if a marketing strategy will lead to a 
TCPA violation.163  This inconsistency increases the likelihood a business 
will accidentally violate the TCPA.  Under a broad interpretation of harm, 
these companies may be found liable, irrespective of the business’ lack 
of intent.  Congress’ goal in enacting the TCPA was to punish “malicious 
and intentional violators,” therefore, businesses may be unduly harmed 
under the current trend of interpretation.164 
Additionally, common payment plans that consumers subscribe to 
for text messaging allows them to send and receive unlimited messages 
for a fixed price.165  Customers with this type of plan pay the same amount 
for text messages, regardless of whether the message is promotional.166  
When consumers brought the initial TCPA claims in 1991, they were able 
to show a financial detriment in receiving unwanted fax 
correspondences.167  For consumers today, receiving a text message does 
not involve the same detriments the TCPA was enacted to prevent.  The 
discrepancy between the amount of harm demonstrated by the initial 
claims and claims filed today is rarely considered.  It should be further 
analyzed by the legislature and the FCC to determine if current TCPA 
claims warrant the same degree of protection granted for consumers in 
1991. 
VII. IS A TEXT MESSAGE AN INJURY? 
As telecommunications technology has advanced, courts have 
attempted to interpret legislation that was enacted before the 
commonplace technology used today existed.168  The prevalence of text 
messaging has led to businesses using it for marketing.169  As explained 
previously, the TCPA has been interpreted to govern text messages.170  
Because of this, claims are beginning to arise under the TCPA alleging 
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that promotional text messages from companies amount to sufficient 
harm to confer Article III standing.171 
When Spokeo was released, it applied to a wide variety of consumer 
litigation claims, including TCPA claims, to aid courts in determining if 
the injuries alleged were sufficient to support Article III standing.172  
After the Susinno decision held that a single unsolicited phone call was 
sufficient to confer Article III standing, some legal scholars, including 
Amanda Bronstad, opined that the TCPA was being interpreted in a 
consumer friendly fashion, with a decidedly broad interpretation of what 
could constitute harm.173 
As previously noted, text messaging has taken up prominence in 
today’s society.  For businesses, it is an efficient and inexpensive method 
to market products and services, and has the ability to reach a large 
population over various demographics.174  For consumers, however, 
receiving text messages from businesses can feel like an invasion; and 
along with being a nuisance, it can lead to accidental purchases if 
businesses send misleading promotions.175 
As of now, one case alleging an injury by way of text message has 
made it to the Circuit Court level.176  While that case found that the text 
message was not sufficient to confer an injury, an analysis of similar 
cases shows that other courts would find a text message a sufficient injury 
to confer Article III standing.177  Because of the influence text messaging 
has on today’s society, it is imperative to consider its effects because (1) 
businesses should be aware of the extent they can use text messages as a 
promotional devise; (2) consumers who are truly being harmed by a 
business’s promotional tactics should be able to find recourse; and (3) 
consumers should be made aware of their rights so businesses cannot 
evade liability just because the injury is relatively minor. 
Additionally, it is important that higher federal courts reach a 
consensus on this issue because text messaging allows businesses to reach 
consumers across a wide range of jurisdictions. Consistency in judicial 
interpretation will allow companies to better comply with the law. 
A. Spokeo Analysis 
The Spokeo analysis has been important for determining the injury 
 
 171  Van Patten, 847 F.3d 1037. 
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requirement of consumer protection claims and is therefore important for 
determining if a text message is a sufficient injury for TCPA claims.  
Courts following Spokeo have used it to determine if injuries alleged by 
plaintiffs are “concrete and particularized.”178  Justice Alito defined a 
particularized injury as one that “affect[s] the plaintiff in a personal and 
individual way.”179  The Court defines a “concrete” injury as one that is 
real as opposed to abstract.180  The opinion in Spokeo specifically 
differentiates these two terms and requires that both be met to confer 
standing.181  Without an “appreciat[ion] [for] the distinction between 
concreteness and particularization,” a court’s standing analysis is 
incomplete.182 
i. Concreteness 
Using the Spokeo analysis, a single unsolicited text message from a 
business can constitute a concrete injury.  An injury is concrete if “it . . .  
actually exist[s]” or is de facto.183  In Spokeo, the Court specifically states 
that tangibility is not a requirement for a concrete injury.184 
When analyzing whether an intangible harm constitutes a concrete 
injury, Justice Alito points to an analysis of “history and the judgment of 
Congress.”185  Historical practices are useful because an “intangible harm 
[that] has a close relationship to a harm that has traditionally been 
regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit in English and American 
courts” is more likely to constitute a sufficient concrete injury against a 
plaintiff.186  Legislative Acts are important because (1) the legislature is 
in a “position[] to identify intangible harms that meet minimum Article 
III requirements” and (2) “Congress may ‘elevat[e] to the status of legally 
cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that were previously 
inadequate at law.”187  Though a legislative act may be indicative of a 
concrete injury, it is not conclusive.188  It would be considered insufficient 
for a plaintiff to allege a “bare procedural violation, divorced from any 
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concrete harm . . . .”189 
In Susinno, the court noted that an injury is concrete when the 
plaintiff “sues under a statute alleging ‘the very injury [the statute] is 
intended to prevent,’ and the injury ‘has a close relationship to a harm . . . 
traditionally . . . providing a basis for a lawsuit in English or American 
courts . . . .”190  When applying this to the plaintiff’s claim regarding a 
single phone call from the defendant, the court noted that (1) Congress 
had identified the injury that it was attempting to protect plaintiffs from, 
and (2) “TCPA claims closely relate to traditional claims for ‘invasions 
of privacy, intrusion upon seclusion, and nuisance [which] have long 
been heard by American courts.’”191  It was based on this analysis that 
the court found the plaintiff had alleged a concrete injury.192 
Based on the Spokeo analysis and the subsequent analysis of 
“concreteness” in the circuit cases that followed, it seems likely that 
sending an unsolicited text message constitutes a concrete injury.  The 
TCPA has been construed to apply to text messages.193  The intent of 
Congress in enacting the TCPA was to “protect the privacy interests of 
residential telephone subscribers by placing restrictions on unsolicited, 
automated telephone calls . . . .”194  Protection of a consumer’s privacy 
by businesses wanting to send unsolicited promotional text messages 
would fit into the legislative intent. 
Additionally, as referenced in Susinno, TCPA claims are rooted in 
the common law protection of privacy, intrusion of seclusion, and 
nuisance.195  Based on both the legislation’s aim to protect the consumer’s 
privacy interest as well as the common law’s interest in protecting similar 
interests, an unsolicited text message would constitute a harm to a 
plaintiff. 
ii. Particularized 
If a plaintiff were to receive a text message and file suit in response 
to that text message, it would constitute a particularized injury.  A 
particularized injury is one that affects the plaintiff as an individual.196  
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The plaintiff argued in Spokeo that the defendant had “violated his 
statutory rights, not just the statutory rights of other people,” and that his, 
“interests . . . [were] individualized rather than collective.”197 
If a plaintiff is filing suit in response to receiving a text message, 
then that person’s statutory rights under the TCPA have been allegedly 
violated.  This is sufficient to confer a particularized injury. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
While it may seem outlandish given the proclivity of text messages 
and the lack of significant harm, the law as it stands today, when 
considering both the TCPA and Spokeo, allows plaintiffs to sue for the 
receipt of an unsolicited text message. 
While general standing may be conferred, other issues should factor 
into the allowance of litigation on the grounds of a text message, such as 
prudential standing and implied consent by consumers.  There should also 
be a consideration of the logic in allowing such litigation to commence 
on the basis of the TCPA.  When the TCPA was enacted, consumers were 
facing abuses by businesses that resulted in a nuisance, a waste of 
consumer’s resources, and potential inability of consumers to use their 
fax machines.  In comparison, the detriment of receiving a text message 
is arguably minor.  Consumers are often able to block numbers they no 
longer wish to receive calls or messages from.  Additionally, single text 
messages are inexpensive, and for many, come as part of a plan that 
makes it so the consumer does not spend additional money for receipt of 
that message.  Further, when a text message is received, it seems unlikely 
that the phone will be unable to function as the consumer wishes it to for 
any significant amount of time. 
That being said, it is well recognized that consumers have a right to 
privacy and the U.S. legal system has recognized that right as 
telecommunication technologies have advanced.  While technology was 
once limited in location, today, cell phones allow consumers to have their 
mobile devices almost anywhere, making it so messaging from an 
unsolicited caller is arguably more intrusive than ever before.  
Additionally, given the wide variety of cellphone plans offered, many 
consumers still face a financial burden, especially if businesses malicious 
and abusive promotional strategies. 
Ultimately, businesses should be able to formulate a clear marketing 
plan, without fear of inadvertently intruding on the rights of consumers, 
and consumers should have the right to protect their privacy.  As it stands, 
the TCPA is outdated.  When the TCPA was enacted in 1991, text 
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messaging was not yet in existence, but today accounts for a substantial 
part of many people’s lives.  Even given its importance, Congress has yet 
to pass specific legislation to address the duties and rights of businesses 
and consumers in regards to promotional text messages. 
To better accommodate both businesses and consumer’s interests, 
new legislation should be considered to address the role of text messages 
in advertising.  By conducting their own research and considering the 
voice of the people, Congress is in the best position to determine when 
there should be standing for a single text message.  Until then, under 
Spokeo, plaintiffs will be injured by receiving a text message. 
 
